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Abstract 
This paper offers a supply-side explanation of the cross-country variation 
in long-run growth and inequality. In the model human capital is 'lumpy' 
and public education directly affects growth, the number of high-skilled 
people and wages. Growth and income equality are shown to depend in 
an important way on the composition of human capital and the produc-
tivity of the education sector. Contrary to some recent results the data 
show that when controlling for initial income or the educational mix of 
the labour force, higher (within-country) inequality (significantly) implies 
lower growth for a typical country in the period 1960-90. Furthermore, 
countries with a more productive education sector have lower inequality. 
Thus, institutions and policies which generate more high-skilled people or 
enhance the productivity of the education sector seem to affect long-run 
income equality and growth in a positive way. 
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1 Introduction 
For a long time economists have been interested in the question of how 
income inequality and growth are associated. Recent results indicate that 
there does not seem to be a robust relationship between inequality and 
growth within countries over time.1 However, based on compilations of 
inequality data from household surveys, it has been found that inequality 
varies substantially across countries. See, for example, Deininger and 
Squire (1996). 
This paper argues that the cross-country variation in growth and 
inequality can be explained well by different education policies or in-
stitutions. These links are first analyzed in a theoretical model whose 
implications are then confronted with empirical evidence. 
One issue for the theory part is that human capital and education 
explain long-run patterns of growth very well. See, for instance, Lucas 
(1988), Azariadis and Drazen (1990) Barra (1991), Mankiw, Romer and 
Weil (1992), Caballe and Santos (1993), Fernandez and Rogerson (1995), 
(1996), or Benabou (1996a), (1996b). 
Secondly, the paper considers the link between distribution and 
growth which has been analyzed in a vast number of contributions. Just 
to name a recent few suffice it to mention Bertola (1993), Alesina and 
Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Garcia-Peiialosa (1995) or 
Perotti (19,96). The consensus emerging from these studies is that in-
equality negatively affects growth. 
However, the consensus has recently been challenged by Deininger 
and Squire (1998) and Forbes (1998) who find a non-robust or even pos-
itive association between inequality and growth. 
In this paper the composition of human capital matters in the 
growth process by assuming that human capital is 'lumpy' and can be 
1 For instance, Li, Squire and Zou (1998) show for many countries that there is little 
variation in within country income dispersions over time. In contrast, Atkinson (1998) 
finds that for the G 7 countries the income dispersions have changed significantly. For 
surveys on the relationship between growth and inequality see e.g. Benabou (1996c), 
Bertola (1998) or Aghion and Howitt (1998), chpt. 9. 
identified with 'degrees'. People are hired as high-skilled workers in the 
labour market only if they have obtained a degree. However, the under-
lying source of income inequality lies in the production process. High-
skilled people carry human capital that enables them to perform all the 
tasks a low-skilled person can do and more. Effective labour depends 
on basic skills and high skills in production. By assumption basic skills 
and high skills are imperfect substitutes in production, but low and high-
skilled people are perfect substitutes in basic skills. As a consequence 
high-skilled people may always perform the tasks of low-skilled people, 
but low-skilled people can never execute tasks that require a degree. 
Thus, in a perfectly competitive labour market the high-skilled 
workers get a wage premium over and above what their low-skilled col-
leagues receive. The wage premium is shown to depend negatively on 
the percentage of high-skilled people, which captures an important and 
realistic aspect in the explanation of wage inequality. (See, for instance, 
Freeman (1977), Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992) 
or Autor, Krueger and Katz (1998).) 
In the model the government finances education by raising a tax on 
the resources (wealth) of all individuals.2 A simple relationship between 
government revenues and education is used by which the percentage of 
high-skilled people in the population is directly related to the tax rate. Ex 
ante all agents are identical in the model so that innate ability or initial 
wealth differences are not important in the set-up.3 The model ignores 
problems arising from the time spent receiving education by assuming 
that education is provided as a public good and that all people spend 
the same time in school, but attend different courses leading to different 
degrees.4 
2Thus, even those who have not received education contribute to financing it. That 
is realistic in most public education systems and may be in the low-skilled people's 
interest. For instance, Rehme (1999) has recently presented a model in which the 
preferred policy of the low-skilled implies higher taxes and higher wages for the low-
skilled, but also lower inequality and higher GDP growth than the preferred policy of 
the high-skilled. 
3For instance, Mincer (1958) or Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) have studied the 
effects of differences in wealth or ability on education and income inequality. 
4Even in countries such as the United States a very significant fraction of educa-
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In equilibrium growth is positively related to the percentage of high-
skilled people in the labour force only up to a certain point, because 
the government takes resources away from the private sector in order to 
finance education, which reduces growth. On the other hand it gener-
ates more high-skilled people which exert a positive effect. on production, 
growth and income equality. For high growth taxes and so the number 
of high-skilled people must not be too high. Furthermore, equality in 
the present value of personal, lifetime incomes as well as growth {for a 
given human capital composition) are shown to depend positively on the 
productivity of the education sector. 
Summarizing, the theoretical model predicts for the long-run that 
(a) countries with relatively more high-skilled people have higher initial 
income and less gross income inequality, and {b) less inequality implies 
higher growth. 
These predictions are then confronted with empirical evidence for 
the period 1960-90. The paper focuses on high quality data which re-
duces the sample size to twenty-one countries. That implies that each 
observation assumes great importance in any qualitative analysis. Sim-
ple correlations reveal that for the period considered and across countries 
inequality as measured by the (within-country, time-average) Gini coef-
ficient covaries positively and the composition of human capital covaries 
negatively with the average growth rate of real GDP per capita. Both 
correlations are relatively weak, but they would suggest that in the long 
run and for the typical country an increase in inequality increases growth. 
However, the second correlation is at odds with what most people find 
in cross-country studies. There it is usually reported that human capital 
positively affects growth. 
Clearly, no single variable alone can explain the cross-country vari-
ations. In fact, when controlling for initial income and the composition 
tion is carried out publicly. Furthermore, governments have fiscal and institutional 
instruments other than direct provision of education at their disposal which have a 
significant bearing on the working of private education systems. For a discussion 
of public vs. private education see, for instance, Glomm and Ravikumar {1992) or 
Fernandez and Rogerson {1998). 
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of the labour force, income inequality as measured by the Gini coeffi-
cient negatively affects growth in all of this paper's cross-country growth 
regressions. Furthermore, when controlling for initial income and in-
equality, an increase in the percentage of high-skilled people increases 
long-run growth across countries. These results are robust across sam-
ples or model specifications and would corroborate the main theoretical 
predictions. 
That raises the question what forces determine the labour force mix 
in production. For instance, differences in the human capital composi-
tion may be caused by the demand side of an economy (e.g. skill-biased 
technological change) in that the firms' technologies require particular 
education mixes which are met by the education sector in equilibrium.5 
This paper argues that they are supply driven in that the gov-
ernment determines the composition by its education policy. The data 
suggest that initially rich (United States) or fast growing (Korea) coun-
tries also have quite productive education technologies which generate 
more high-skilled people for given resources channelled into education 
than other countries. The productivity diffenmces may be due to po-
litical decisions such as how the school system is organized (elitist or 
egalitarian), or how it is financed {fee structure), but also factors such as 
history, labour market conditions and other institutional arrangements. 
Contrary to· some recent results the paper's main insight is that 
the association between long-run growth and personal income inequality 
seems robust, is found to be negative across countries and appears to 
be well explained by national differences in public education policies or 
institutions. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoreti-
cal model and derives testable predictions. Section 3 confronts the model 
with empirical evidence using high quality data. Section 4 provides con-
cluding remarks. 
5The paper abstracts from the important phenomenon of skill-biased technological 
change and should, therefore, be viewed as complementary to recent models along the 
lines of, .for instance, Acemoglu (1998), Huw (1999), or Caselli (1999). 
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2 The Model 
Consider an economy that is populated by N (large) members of two 
representative dynasties of infinitely lived individuals. The two dynasties 
are high-skilled workers, Lh, and low-skilled workers, £1, where Lh, L1 
denote the total numbers of the respective agents in each dynasty. The 
difference between high and low-skilled labour is "lumpy", that is, either 
an individual has received education in the form of a degree and is then 
considered high-skilled or it has no degree and remains in the low-skilled 
labour pool. 
By assumption the population is stationary so that Lh = xN and 
L1 = (1- x)N where x denotes the percentage of high-skilled people in 
population. Each worker supplies one unit of either high or low-skilled 
labour inelastically over time. All agents initially own an equal share 
of the total capital stock, which is held in the form of shares of many 
identical firms operating in a world of perfect competition. Thus, all 
agents receive wage and capital income and make investment decisions. 
Furthermore, aggregate output is produced according to 
0 <a< 1, (1) 
where Kt denotes the aggregate capital stock including disembodied tech-
nological knowledge,6 H measures effective labour in production, and At 
is a productivity index at timet. The production function is a reduced 
form of the following relationship: By assumption effective labour de-
pends on basic skills and high skills and that basic skills and high skills are 
imperfect substitutes in production. On the other hand it is assumed that 
low and high-skilled people are perfect substitutes in basic skills. Thus, 
high-skilled people may always perform the tasks of low-skilled people in 
the model,· but low-skilled people can never execute tasks that require a 
degree. (See Appendix A.l.) Notice that each type of labour alone is not 
6Thus, technological knowledge is taken to be a sort of capital good which is used 
to produce final output in combination with other factors of production. For an up-to-
date discussion of these kinds of endogenous growth models see, for instance, Aghion 
and Howitt (1998), chpt. 1. 
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an essential input in production. 
The government runs a balanced budget, uses its tax revenues to 
finance public education and maintains a constant ratio of expenditure 
Gt to its tax base.7 It taxes the agents' wealth holdings at a constant 
rater. The capital stock (wealth) of the representative agent is kt = IJl 
so that Gt = rktN = TKt and ~ = T for all t. Thus, real resources 
are taken from the private sector and used to finance public education, 
which generates high-skilled agents. 8 
In general, public education is 'produced' using government re-
sources and other factors such as high-skilled labour itself. That is cap-
tured by the following reduced form of the education technology 
x = r• where 0 < E ::::; 1 , (2) 
x,. = ET•-l > 0 and x,.,. = E(E- 1)r•-2 ::::; 0. Thus, if the government 
channels more resources into education, it will generate more high-skilled 
people, x,. > 0. However, doing this generally becomes more difficult 
at the margin, x,.,. < 0, because more public resources provided to the 
education sector lead to a decreasing marginal product of those resources 
due to congestion or other effects. 
The parameter E measures the productivity of the education sector.9 
If E < 1, the education sector is productive and a marginal increase in 
taxes increases education output substantially. Underlying that is the 
7It would be possible to investigate various tax bases in the model. Capital taxes 
are considered to keep the analysis simple and are supposed to capture a broad class 
of tax arrangements, the aim of which is to channel public resources into education. 
For a similar approach in a different context see Alesina and Rodrik (1994). 
8In the model agents are endowed by the same basic ability and receive basic 
education which is produced and provided costlessly. Education is always meant 
to be higher education. Ex ante everybody is a candidate for receiving (higher) 
education and once chosen to be in the education process will complete the degree. 
The education process is taken to be sufficiently productive in converting no skills 
into high-skills. 
9The reduced form directly relates the percentage of high-skilled people ( x) to the 
percentage of resources (wealth) going into the education sector (r). Let pr denote 
the productivity of the education sector. Then pr = ~ = r•-l, which is decreasing in 
e for given policy. 
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description of an education sector with spillovers from, for instance, high-
skilled to new high-skilled people or where the capital equipment such 
as computers makes the education technology very productive. For a 
justification of the set-up see Appendix A.2. 
The Private Sector. There are as many identical firms as individ-
uals and the firms face perfect competition and maximize profits. By 
assumption the firms are subject to knowledge spillovers, which take the 
form At = ( IJ;) 'I = ki with 'TJ 2: a. Thus, the average stock of capital, 
which includes disembodied technological knowledge, is the source of a 
positive externality.10 Then simplify by setting 'TJ = a which allows one 
to concentrate on steady state behaviour. For a justification see Romer 
(1986). As the firms cannot influence the externality, it does not enter 
their decision directly so that 
(3) 
The workers have logarithmic utility and own all the assets which 
are collateralized one-to-one by capital. A representative worker takes 
the paths of r, wh, Wt, r as given and solves the problem 
s.t. 
max 1= ln c.; e-pt dt 
Ci 0 
k = w; + (r- r)k- c.; 
ko = given, koo = free. 
i = l,h 
(4) 
(5) 
Equation (5) is the worker's dynamic budget constraint. The work-
er's problem is a standard one and its solution involves the following 
10The results would not change if the externality depended on the entire capital 
stock instead. 
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growth rate of the average high or low-skilled worker's consumption 
(6) 
Thus, consumption of all workers grows at the same rate in the 
optimum and depends on the after-tax return on capital. As the agents 
own the initial capital stock equally and have identical utility functions, 
their investment decisions are the same. But then the wealth distribution 
will not change over time and all agents continue to own equal shares of 
the total capital stock over time. 
Market Equilibrium. For the rest of the paper normalize by setting 
N = 1 so that the factor rewards in (3) are given by 
The return on capital is constant over time and wages grow with the cap-
ital stock. As wh = w1 ( 1 + xa-l), high-skilled labour receives a premium 
over what their low-skilled counterpart gets. That reflects the fact that 
the high-skilled may always perfectly substitute for low-skilled labour 
so that both types of labour receive the same wage w1 for routine tasks 
and that performing high-skilled tasks is remunerated by the additional 
amount w, xa-l. The prelnium depends on the percentage of high-skilled 
labour in the population, grows over time at the rate 1 and is decreasing 
in x for a given capital stock. 
From the production function one immediately gets /y = 'Yk so 
that per capita output and the capital-labour ratio grow at the same 
rate. With constant N total output also grows at the same rate as the 
aggregate capital stock. From (6) the consumption of the representative 
worker grows at 1. Each worker owns k0 = Iff units of the initial capital 
stock. Equation (5) implies k = wi+(r-T)k-Ci so that 'Yk = -(r-
T) fori = l, h where (r- T) is constant. In steady state, /k is constant 
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by definition. But T is constant as well, because from (7) 
Wh _ akt{l + xa-1) = {l a-1) d Wz _ kt - kt a + x an kt - a, 
which implies lk = I· Thus, the economy is characterized by balanced 
growth in steady state with IY = IK = ly = lk = lch = lc1• 
Furthermore, from equation (5) and using lkk = k and lk = lch = 
lct in steady state one obtains (r - r - p)kt = w; + (r - r)kt - e;. 
Thus, e; = w; + pkt ( i = h, l) are the instantaneous consumption levels 
of a representative high or low-skilled worker in steady state. Notice 
that ch > c1 for positive x. From (6), (7) and T = x~ one obtains 
1 = (1- a) (1 + xa)- x~ - p so that for given Tan increase in x raises 
growth. It is also not difficult to verify that 
< 1 
x = [w(1- a)]I=ro, and f = [w(1- a)] ~-<a 
maximize growth, which is concave in x since fort::::; 1 and any x 
cFI 
"'(1 "')2xa-2 (dx)2 = -~ ~ 1 (1 ) 1-2< ; ; - 1 x-,- < 0. 
By the concavity of 1 and given the above properties there exists x, 
generating the same growth as 1(0). Thus, in the model it is possible 
that an economy has high-skilled workers, but does not do better than 
another economy with no high-skilled people. The effect of a change in 
the productivity of the education sector for a given x E (0, 1) is given by 
1 ~~ = ln(x~ x< < 0. Hence, a reduction in t:, that is, making the education 
technology more productive, raises growth. 
Lemma 1 The growth rate 1 satisfies the following properties: 
1. 1 is concave in x. 2. ~; < 0 for x E (0, 1). 3. If x = x, then 1(0) = 1(x). 
The properties can be read off from Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1: 'Y as a function of x for different E 
X 
Income Inequality. As growth is often related to measures of gross 
income inequality, the paper concentrates on the distribution of gross (of 
tax) income. In the model all income differences are due to differences in 
wage income. When one relates growth to income inequality one should 
look at an average of personal incomes over time. If the agents sold their 
income stream in a perfect capital market, they would discount their 
income stream by r- T, that is, by the after-tax market rate of return 
on assets. As their gross income at any point in time is Yit = W;t + rk11 
the present value of their lifetime incomes is 
100 -(r-r)tdt -100 ;t -(r-r)t _ Yio _ d h · z h Yit e - Y;o e e - - = Y; w ere z = , . 0 0 p 
Thus, yf denotes the sum of an individual's gross incomes discounted by 
the after-tax market rate of return on assetsY Notice yf = wf + rk0 
where 
Wt ako wh ak0(1 + x"-1) 
wf = - = - and w~ = - = (8) p p p p 
110ther income variables one may want to use are (gross) current income Yit, de-
trended initial incomes y;o, or capital adjusted incomes Ff.-· All of these concepts 
suffer from the problem that they do not fully reflect the path incomes follow. 
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and that the mean of the discounted sum of incomes is 
d d {1 + xa)ako 
p, = {1- x)w1 + xwt + rko = . p (9) 
dwd dwd d d implying a.:: = 0, ~ < 0 and :l:r: > 0 so that the mean of the PV of 
lifetime gross income is increasing in x. In order to compare any two 
cumulative income distributions of discounted lifetime income assume 
x1 > x. Then the different values of x will give rise to two cumulative 
distribution functions, F(yf(x1 )) and G(yf(x)) with unequal means. 
If F dominates G in the sense of Second Order Stochastic Domi-
nance (SOSD), then F will be preferred toG by any increasing, concave 
social welfare function according to Atkinson ( 1970) .12 Second Order 
Stochastic Dominance is equivalent to Generalized Lorenz Curve (GLC) 
dominance. (For a proof see, for example, Lambert {1993), pp. 62-66.) 
A GLC is obtained by multiplying the values of the y-axis of an ordinary 
Lorenz Curve, which relates the share of the population (x-axis) to the 
share in total income (y-axis) which that population share receives, by 
mean income, i.e. (share of total income) x (mean income). 
0 
Figure 2: Generalized Lorenz Curve 
1-XI 1-x 
share in population 
mean income 




12Formally and for non-negative incomes, Second Order Stochastic Dominance re-
quires J; F( w )dw S foe G( w )dw. Geometrically, a distribution F( w) dominates an-
other distribution G( w) in the sense of SOSD if over every interval [0, c], the area 
under F(w) is never greater (and sometimes smaller) than the corresponding area 
under G(w). 
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A GLC dominates another one if the two curves do not cross and one 
is completely above the other one. In Figure 2 the income distribution 
with x1 > x GLC-dominates the income distribution for x, because an 
increase in x raises J.Ld and shifts the kink at B to a point B' which is to 
the left and above GLC(x). 
According to a theorem by Shorrocks (1983) every individualis-
tic additively separable, symmetric, and inequality-averse social welfare 
function would prefer the GLC dominating income distribution. Hence, 
according to the GLC dominance criterion there exists a unanimous 
preference for the income distribut~on with the higher GLC. Even the 
high-skilled would prefer the distribution with a higher x under a veil of 
ignorance.13 
Let I(x) be any inequality measure reflecting that a higher x leads 
to a GLC dominating income distribution. Then I(O) = 1(1) = 0 < I(x) 
and ;i;; < 0 for x E (0, 1). Thus, according to I(x) and for the PV of 
J.!.fetime gross incomes there is no measured inequality if all agents get 
the same wage and they are all either equally high or low-skilled. When 
there is any skill heterogeneity, producing more skills reduces inequality. 
Furthermore, as x = r', a decrease in € for a given policy would lower 
I(x). 
Proposition 1 If there is heterogeneity in skills, an increase in the per-
centage of high-skilled people or an increase in the productivity of the edu-
cation technology for given policy reduce inequality in the present value of 
lifetime (gross) incomes in the sense of Generalized Lorenz Curve Dom-
inance. 
Taking .the Model to the Data. In practice it is very difficult to 
calculate an agent's PV of lifetime gross income. Furthermore, it is 
usually difficult to find or to choose inequality measures satisfying certain 
13Exactly the same holds for the distribution of detrended (initial) incomes y;o and 
capital adjusted incomes !If.-· It also holds if one works with current incomes Yit and 
x :::; x. In that case an increase in x causes the new GLC to be everywhere above the 
old GLC for t > 0, because the capital stock would be higher at each date and mean 
income would rise. However, if x > :i; it does not necessarily hold. 
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desirable properties. One inequality measure that is frequently reported 
and employed in empirical research is the Gini coefficient, which measures 
the area between the Lorenz Curve and the 45° degree line as a fraction 
of the total area uilder the 45° degree line. A Gini coefficient of 0 {1) 
reports perfect equality {inequality). 
In the model the G ini coefficient for the PV of lifetime gross income, 
but also for current and capital adjusted gross income is given by 
GY(x) = a{1- x)x"' 
1+x"' 
{10) 
and is not unambiguously decreasing in x, because for low (high) x an 
increase in human capital increases {decreases) G9 • See Appendix A.3. 
That raises three issues which merit comment for the subsequent empir-
ical analysis. 
First, the Gini coefficient in {10) is derived under the assumption 
of equal capital ownership and income. In reality, the capital income 
component of the distribution of total personal gross incomes affects (of-
ten reduces) measured inequality. However, the model's Gini coefficient 
captures that empirically the main source of inequality stems from wage 
inequality. (See Atkinson {1998), p. 19). 
Second, households may consist of people with different educational 
backgrounds. But notice that when household surveys are based on ob-
servations of individual units, the Gini coefficient would not change its 
informational content if there was a rearrangement of persons into high 
or low-skilled groups. 
Third, ambiguity in Gini coefficients reflects the well-known fact 
that Lorenz curves often intersect so that clear rankings of income dis-
tributions with equal or unequal means would not be possible by simple 
Lorenz curve comparisons. See e.g. Atkinson {1970) and, in particu-
lar, Fields {1987) who shows that the Gini coefficient usually generates 
a Kuznets curve by construction, when incomes are rising. However, 
changes in income (e.g. real GDP per capita) is what growth is all about. 
Thus, measurement issues such as the choice of inequality measures are 
13 
important and may not have received enough attention in the macroeco-
nomics and growth literature. 
For the model that raises an important point. Suppose the economies 
were identical except for their composition of human capital. Then coun-
tries with a higher x should have a higher mean and lower inequality in 
time-average incomes. That result (Proposition 1) was derived from the 
general notion of GLC Dominance. If the collection and quality of data 
force one to employ a simple measure like the Gini coefficient, one may 
find that countries with a higher x show up higher Gini coefficients, al-
though over time gross income inequality in those countries may actually 
be lower than in other countries. 
Expressing growth as a function of the Gini coefficient yields 
[
a(1- x)xa] 1 i(GY,x)=(1-a) Gu -x<-p. (11) 
For given x an increase in the Gini coefficient lowers growth. Further-
more, equation (1) implies 'Z > 0, that is, output at any date is increas-
ing in x. Thus, initial income is predicted to be higher for countries with 
a higher x as well. · 
In cross-country growth empirics variables such as Yo or GY are 
often included in the regressions. Equation (11) suggests that the model 
1(G9 , x, y0; R) be investigated, where G9 , x, and 'flo= ln Yo are taken to 
be the main explanatory variables and R denotes a vector of exogenous 
variables not included in the regression. Furthermore, 
aG9 a1 aYQ 
-a < 0, aG < 0, and -a > 0. (12) 
X lx suff. high g X 
are the predicted signs of the coefficients in regression analyses testing 
the model.14 
14Three alternative models would really require analysis, namely -y( G9 (x), x, y0 ; R), 
-y(G9,x,ffo(x);R), or -y(G9 (x),x,ffo(x);R) which would recognize the endogeneity of 
GY and y0. Unfortunately, these models cannot be tested adequately here due to the 
small sample size of high quality data used in the paper. 
14 
3 Empirical Evidence 
The basic implication of the theoretical model is that countries with rel-
atively more high-skilled people have higher initial income and less gross 
income inequality over time. Less income inequality is in turn predicted 
to imply higher long-run growth. In order to test these implications the 
paper follows the common procedure of cross-country growth regressions 
by taking averages of data over time and running cross-country OLS 
regressions over these averaged data. For similar approaches see Barro 
(1991), Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Sala-i-Martin (1997) and many oth-
ers. 
All empirical studies linking education and income inequality with 
macroeconomic phenomena such as GDP growth are severely limited by 
the availability of high quality data. The present study is no exception. 
For instance, many authors use secondary school enrollment as a proxy 
for the measurement of human capital. Such a proxy suffers from the 
problem that school enrollment does not necessarily imply that students 
actually graduate or that graduates find jobs and become economically 
active. 
The paper focuses on the composition of human capital which is 
measured by the percentage of the labour force from 25 to 64 years of 
age who have attained at least upper secondary education.15 Data for 
that variable are provided by the OECD Education Database for 1996 
and 34 countries. Thus, the variable may represent a better picture 
of the link between the human capital mix and production than school 
enrollment rates. Notice that it collapses the time series dimension into 
a single number by attaching weights to the human capital composition 
of different generations of all those who are economically active at a 
particular point in time. 
Breaking the variable down by age cohorts reveals for the population 
as a whole that in almost all countries the percentage of the population 
that has attained at least upper secondary education has risen over time. 
Table Al.l, p. 34. Notice the binary nature of the variable. 
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(See Table A1.2a on p. 35.) For instance, in the United States 77 percent 
of the population aged 55-64 had attained at least upper secondary ed-
ucation whereas it is 87 percent for those aged 25-34. (For Germany the 
numbers are 71 percent for age group 55-64 and 86 percent for age group 
25-34. More impressively, for fast growing Korea it is 25 percent for age 
group 55-64 and 88 percent for age group 25-34.) The implicit assump-
tion here is that the variable for the labour force represents a long-run 
process which does not significantly change over time. 
Comparable data on income distributions for large samples of coun-
tries are rare and often do not satisfy minimum quality requirements. 
However, Deininger and Squire {1996) have compiled a high quality and 
very valuable data set on inequality, covering many countries and pe-
riods. Their {minimum) standards of quality require that the data be 
based on {1) actual observation of individual units drawn from house-
hold surveys, {2) a representative sample covering all of the population, 
and {3) comprehensive coverage of different income sources as well as 
population groups. The reported Gini coefficients from their data set are 
used in this paper. 
In an intertemporal framework one should measure inequality in 
lifetime incomes. That would require calculating some form of time-
average of the incomes for households or individuals. Gini coefficients 
of such averages for large samples of countries do not exist. As an ap-
proximation one may take averages of Gini coefficients over time and 
interpret that average as the Gini coefficient of an average of income dis-
tributions at different dates. In this paper averages of Gini coefficients 
for each country are taken for the period 1960-90 and are meant to reflect 
long-run within-country inequality. 
The income and recipient concept is gross income per household 
and, in contrast to Deininger /Squire or Forbes, it is strictly adhered 
to.l6 
16The strict adherence to these concepts results in a small sample. Deininger and 
Squire (1998) and Forbes (1998) construct 'average' Gini coefficients by taking aver-
ages of Gini coefficients based on gross or net income or adjusted (add 6 percentage 
points) Gini coefficients based on expenditure, each for individual or household in-
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The assumption that the average Gini coefficients represent steady 
states is only an approximation. For instance, for the United States 
there appears to be an upward trend in income inequality in the sample 
period, whereas for France income inequality seems to have fallen over 
time and for Germany no clear picture emerges. (See the Data Appendix, 
ftn. 22.) Unfortunately, not enough data are available to uncover any 
robust time series behaviour of the reported Gini values for all countries 
in the sample. In 'defence' of viewing the average Gini coefficient as a 
steady state variable notice that countries with positive trends are usually 
showing up higher levels. 
A related and important point is that most researchers restrict at-
tention to initial positions. For instance, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) run 
their cross-country growth regressions on a measure of initial income in-
equality. Notice, however, that in contrast to classical growth theory 
(e.g. Solow (1956) or Kaldor (1957)), the income distribution determines 
growth at each point in time in endogenous growth models. Thus, growth 
is not predicted to depend just on the initial income distribution. 
Working with inequality as an explanatory variable in the growth 
regressions assumes that the causality is from distribution to growth. 
That assumption is made throughout the paper and, thus, does not ques-
tion the validity of endogenous growth frameworks. Hence, the hypoth-
esis that GDP growth (a macroeconomic concept) may 'cause' changes 
in personal income inequality (a micro economic concept) is rejected on 
a priori grounds in this paper. That may justify the use of time-average 
Gini coefficients in the subsequent analysis. 
Furthermore, long-run growth rates were calculated for the period 
1960-90 using the Penn World Table (Mark 5.6) from Summers and He-
ston (1991). All the other data are taken from Barra and Lee (1994). 
Together with the OECD and inequality data the sample comprises 21 
come recipients, for each country and year according to some quality criterion above. 
That procedure may yield a large sample, but a lot of important information is lost, 
making it very likely that their coefficients on inequality are biased upwards. On the 
importance of income and recipient concepts in the measurement of inequality see, 
for instance, Atkinson (1983), Lambert (1993), or Cowell (1995). 
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countries for which high quality data are available and which represent 
a significant fraction of world output. 
Results. In the sample the typical country has a time-average Gini 
value of 36.7 with a standard deviation (SD) of7.9, has approximately 61 
percent of the labour force who have at least upper secondary edusation 
(SD 22) and grows at 3.1 percent (SD 1.4)_17 Thus, relatively there is 
not much variability in growth rates in the sample, but income inequality 
and the skill composition seem to differ widely across countries. 
A standard deviation of 1.1 percentage points in growth rates may 
seem small, but it produces pronounced dynamic effects. If two economies 
started with the same initial income in 1960 and their growth rates dif-
fered by 1.1 percentage points, it would take the economy with the higher 
growth rate around 63 years ( approx. 3 generations) to have twice the 
level of real GDP per capita of the other country. Thus, small differ-
ences in growth rates produce great differences in per capita income over 
time.18 
For the sample period the intra-country variability in Gini values is 
low. For instance, they changed little in the United States and Germany 
(SD 1.42 and 0.76 percentage points, respectively) and changed most in 
France and Turkey (SD around 6 percentage points.) One should bear 
in mind that these small intra-country changes in Gini coefficients may 
reflect huge changes in welfare, that is, small variability in intra-country 
Gini coefficients may have drastic effects on some groups' income and 
17Sumrnary statistics of the high quality data are presented in Table 3, p. 33. 
18For example, in 1960 Germany and Korea had 67 percent, resp. 9 percent of the 
level of U.S. real GDP per capita. If real GDP in the United States continued to 
grow at 2 percent and, starting in 1960, Germany's and Korea's real GDP continued 
to grow at 2.6 percent and 6.7 percent it would take Germany 67 years and Korea 51 
years to have the same level of real GDP per capita as the United States in the year 
2027, resp. 2011. Thus, in 1990 it should take Germany another 37 years {approx. 2 
generations) and Korea another 21 years (approx. 1 generation) to catch up with the 
United States. {These calculations are based on continuous growth, where the time 
unit is taken to be a year.) That highlights what differences in growth rates imply and 
justifies why any effects causing even only small cross-country differences in growth 
rates are worth analyzing. 
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overall welfare. However, the variability in inter-country, time-average 
Gini coefficients is even far greater. 
Suppose the mean income in two economies were equal, then from 
the sample a one standard deviation difference would imply Gini values 
of 30 vs. 45, that is, a difference of 15 percentage points. That may entail 
huge welfare differences for the average income recipient in each country. 
Table 1: Simple Correlations 
G6().90 SECL AIHG LY60 TERL OECO GEOU PRlGHT CVLIB 
SECL -0.366 1.000 
AIHG 0.146 -0.716 1.000 
LY60 -0.790 0.789 -0.640 1.000 
TERL -0.117 0.644 -0.486 0.453 1.000 
OECO -0.659 0.570 -0.632 0.832 0.307 1.000 
GEOU -0.393 0.733 -0.507 0.639 0.493 0.459 1.000 
PRlGHT 0.729 -0.734 0.630 -0.948 -0.349 -0.844 -0.640 1.000 
CVLIB 0.766 -0.701 0.631 -0.940 -0.365 -0.803 -0.676 0.970 1.000 












average growth rate of real GOP per capita for the period 196()..90 
Percentage of the labour force from 25 to 65 years of age who have attained at least 
upper secondary education. (Source: OECD) 
Percentage of the labour force from 25 to 65 years of age who have attained tertiary 
education. (Source: OECD) 
Average Gini coefficient for gross income of households for the period 196()..1990. 
(Source: Deininger/Squire) 
Natural logarithm of the level of real GOP per capita in 1960. 
Government expenditure on education as a fraction of GOP for the period 196().85. 
Gastil's index of political rights (from 1 to 7; 1 = most freedom). 
Gastil's index of civil liberties (from 1 to 7; 1 = most freedom). 
Dummy for OECO countries. 
Imputed productivity index of the education technology (from 0 to 1; 0 most 
productive) for the period 196().85. 
The simple correlations in Table 1 suggest the following interpreta-
tions: An increase in the percentage of persons in the labour force with at 
least upper secondary or with tertiary education reduces growth across 
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countries. (This effect is relatively small.) Countries with higher initial 
income have lower growth (relatively strong effect) and those with higher 
income inequality have higher growth (relatively weak effect). Economies 
operating with a more high-skilled labour force have less income inequal-
ity and higher initial income. On average OECD countries have lower 
long-run growth, operate their economies with a relatively higher skilled 
labour force and have higher initial income, and lower income inequality. 
Interestingly and in relative terms, countries granting citizens more po-
litical or civil rights seem to have lower growth, but have higher initial 
income, spend more on education, have a more qualified labour force, 
and lower income inequality.19 
Some of these direct effects are merely suggestive and - perhaps -
not overly surprising. What is of interest in this context is that growth 
seems to covary positively with income inequality and negatively with 
the human capital composition and the education finance variable. The 
~atter property is odd, as most studies find that human capital and more 
public resources for education affect long-run growth in a significantly 
positive way. (See e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), chpt. 12, Table 
12.3.) Notice that the positive correlation between growth and inequality 
would seem to contradict the model's predictions. 
However, simple correlations may present a misleading picture of 
any 'true', cross-country relationship between long-run growth and other 
economic variables. Furthermore, equation (11) only holds conditional 
on x. It is clear that a macro variable such as growth of GDP per capita 
is influenced by many different factors so that controlling for other factors 
is called for. 
Co~umns (1) and (2) in Table 2 indicate that, when controlling for 
upper secondary education, income inequality and initial income, tertiary 
education and being a member country of the OECD does not signifi-
cantly add to the explanation of long-run growth. 
19The OECD variable shares all the features of the variables PRlGHT and CVLIB 
when interpreting more political or civil rights as being a member .country of the 
OECD. 
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Table 2: Cross-Country Growth Regressions for 1960-90 
{1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Canst. 21.722 21.864 22.155 17.810 21.246 5.993 
(2.136) (2.060) (1.688) (1.786) (2.012} . (2.430) 
(0.000( (0.000( (0.000( (0.000( (0.000( (0.024( 
SECL 0.020 0.021 0.022 0.035 -0.028 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.016) 
(0.051( (0.019( (0.007( (0.008( (0.100( 
AIHG -0.066 -0.067 -0.065 -0.087 -0.034 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) {0.04.4} 
(0.003( (0.002( (0.008( (0.000) (0.450} 
LY60 -2.100 -2.107 -2.168 -2.030 - 1.800 (0.316) (0.307) (0.194) (0.261) (0.184) 
(0.000( (0.000( (0.000( (0.000( (0.000( 
TERL 0.010 (0.022) 
(0.655( 
OECD -0.109 -0.118 (0.462) {0.450) 
(0.817( (0.796( 
R2 0.901 0.900 0.900 0.801 0.844 0.162 
No. ofobs. 21 21 21 21 21 21 
The dependent variable is the average growth rate of real GDP per capita over 
the period 1960-90. The estimation method is OLS. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses and t-probabilities are reported in square brackets. 
Therefore, the paper's core variables are SECL, AIHG and LY60. 
In all regressions initial GDP has a negative impact on growth, which 
would corroborate the hypothesis of conditional convergence, that is, that 
initially poorer economies tend to have higher subsequent growth. Ac-
cording to the model initially poorer countries have less human capital, 
a prediction that is borne out by the data. (Recall the simple corre-
lation between LY60 and SECL of around 79 percent.) Thus, LYGO de-
pends positively on SECL. This endogeneity is ignored in the regressions, 
as more regressors required by more sophisticated estimation methods 
would make statistical results more fragile. 
Models (3) to (5) test the key relationships of the theoretical model 
and show that controlling for initial income or income inequality an in-
crease in the human capital of the labour force (significantly) raises a 
typical economy's rate of growth. Furthermore, controlling for initial in-
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come or human capital, more gross income inequality reduces long-run 
growth. These models appear to explain growth rather well. However, 
relatively high R2s may also indicate multicollinearity among the regres-
sor variables. But as the model implies that to be the case, they may 
really reflect the explanatory power of the theoretical model. 
Thus, the labour force composition has a level effect on initial in-
come which in turn affects long-run growth. When controlling for that 
effect it has an impact on growth and it affects the personal income dis-
tribution. The results suggest that it reduces income inequality for a 
typical country and raises growth. Over the sample period economies 
that had initially higher income, had a more skilled labour force and 
lower income inequality. 
Model (6) appears to be doing badly. The point estimate for the 
effect of human capital on growth is negative. On the other hand notice 
the large drop in R2• As Model ( 6) captures the only variables con-
templated in theory part, one might think that the theoretical ~odel is 
flawed. However, there the relationship between the Gini coefficient and 
x is non-linear. Thus, one may only conclude that a linear approximation 
of the theoretical model by OLS does not perform well. Furthermore, the 
estimates are probably biased. If any 'true' model should include LY60 
as an explanatory variable and if the 'true' effect of initial income on 
gTowth is negative as most studies assume and show, then the estimated 
coefficient SECL is biased downwards. Hence, due to an omitted variable 
bias the effect of SECL on growth may be significantly underestimated 
in Model (6). 
Summarizing: When controlling for initial income countries with a 
more skilled labour force or lower inequality had higher long-run growth. 
In all regressions and when controlling for initial income or human capi-
tal, income inequality negatively affects long-run growth. Thus, countries 
with lower inequality than the typical one should be doing better in terms 
of growth. 20 
20The results are robust to changes in the sample (e.g. when eliminating dubious, 
high quality data). These sensitivity checks are not reported here due to lack of space, 
but are available from the author. See the Data Appendix for further details. 
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In the paper the composition of human capital is supply driven. 
Cross-country differences in public education lead to different skill mixes, 
which influence an economy's growth and income inequality. 
That raises the question why some economies have a more skilled 
labour force than others. One answer may be that they possess more pro-
ductive education technologies. The variable EDUPR in Table 3 prox-
ies how productive public resources have been in generating more high-
skilled people over the sample period and attempts to pick up the produc-
tivity parameter E in the theoretical model. 21 The variable suggests that 
the United States and Germany, which have the highest percentage of 
people who have at least upper secondary education, also have the most 
productive education technologies. These two countries seem to generate 
more people with high skills for every unit of public resources channelled 
into education than all the other economies in the sample. These pro-
ductivity differences may not be important for growth, but from Table 1 
they seem to correlate highly with income inequality and initial income. 
All countries in the sample that have relatively unproductive education 
technologies also seem to be those that have high inequality. This :mg-
gests for a typical country that rather than the amount of resources going 
into education it is really the productivity of generating more high-skilled 
people that would help to reduce income inequality. 
4 Concluding Remarks 
The experience of high growth economies suggests that there is a link 
from education to income equality and growth. The paper provides a 
supply-driven explanation of how that link may operate across countries. 
In the model the composition of human capital directly affects in-
equality and growth. Due to technology, and market imperfections or in-
stitutional restrictions, high-skilled workers contribute more to effective 
21 Clearly, not all resources channelled into education are targeted at secondary 
education. But given the binary nature of SECL, and given data for GEDU, EDUPR 
may be a reasonable approximation to measure the (long-run) productivity of the 
education technologies. 
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labour in production than their unskilled counterpart. The high-skilled 
receive a wage premium which depends on how many of them are present 
· in the economy. The government provides public education which pro-
duces human capital in the form of high-skilled· people. It is shown that 
the productivity of the education sector positively affects growth and 
income equality. Furthermore, the model implies that countries with a 
more high-skilled labour force should exhibit lower inequality. 
Using high quality data for the period 1960-90 it is found that, when 
controlling for initial income, long-run growth is higher for countries that 
(a) had a relatively more high-skilled labour force or (b) had lower income 
inequality as measured by the (time-average) Gini-coefficient. The data 
also suggest that countries with a more productive, public education 
technology exhibit lower income inequality. 
Cross-country productivity differences in education may be due to 
many things such as history, labour market conditions, physical and hu-
man capital equipment used in schooling, laws, school financing (fees) 
etc. Furthermore, the differences may also reflect different demand con-
ditions. 
Untangling the precise demand-supply relationships between hu-
man capital, technology and institutions in the explanation of growth or 
inequality is interesting ongoing research and has been beyond the scope 
of this paper. These and other problems are left for future research. 
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A Technical Appendix 
A.l Technology 
By assumption yt = AtHf K{-a, where the index of effective labour H de-
pends on labour requiring basic skills (B) and labour requiring high skills (S). 
Labour requiring basic skills is performed by high and low-skilled persons, 
B = B(Lt. Lh), whereas high-skilled labour is only performed by high-skilled 
persons, S = S(Lh)· High and low-skilled people are perfect substitutes to 
each other when performing basic skill (routine) tasks, i.e. B(Lt. L~t) = L1+L,,. 
Thus, high-skilled people also perform those routine tasks a low-skilled person 
may do. On the other hand, only high-skilled people can perform high-skilled 
tasks (labour) and for simplicity let S(Lh) Lh. To capture the relationship 
I I 
between labour inputs assume H = [BP + SP]P = [(Lh + L1)P + Lf.] "P. For 
p < !labour requiring basic skills (B) and labour requiring high skills (S) are 
imperfect (less than perfect) substitutes. For ease of calculations let p = a < 1 
which yields equation (1). 
A.2 Discrete Time Justification for x = re 
Equation (2) is compatible with many models that also use high-skilled labour 
as an input generating education. For instance, let ht denote the total stock of 
human capital in the economy in a discrete time model. Assume that human 
capital evolves according to 
where new human capital ht+l is produced by non-increasing returns. Here 
human capital formation would depend on the level of the stock of knowledge 
ht, government resources provided for education Gt and the tax base Kt. 
The function f(-) governs the evolution of human capitaL Assume that it 
is separable in the form f(g(Gt,Kt),ht)· Let g = c (*) = c(r) and for 
simplicity 
ht+l=c(r)hf, where c20, c'>O, c":::;o, 0<{3<1. 
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where {3 measures the productivity of the education sector and c(r) captures 
the efficiency or quality of education, depending on the government resources 
channelled into education. For similar expressions see, for example, eqns. (1), 
(2) in Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), eqn. {1) in Eckstein and Zilcha (1994), 
or eqn. (2) in Razin and Yuen (1996). 
In the model human capital is carried discretely so ht = XtN. Normalize 
population by setting N = 1. Then total human capital at date t is given by 
Xt· In steady state x = Xt = xt+1 and so 
I 
x = c(r) 1 -.B. 
Next suppose that the efficiency of the education sector is described by c( r) 
rP where 0 < J.l < 0. For non-increasing returns to scale it is necessary that 
J.l + {3 $ 1. Let R = e then the more explicit set-up would be equivalent to 
(2) in steady state. As Xe < 0, any increase e would mean that less human 
capital is generated in steady state. From non-increasing returns to scale it 
follows that J.L $ 1 - {3 so that e $ 1. Hence, e = 1 would represent a relatively 
unproductive human capital formation process. 
A.3 The Gini Coefficient 
A Lorenz Curves (LC) relates population shares to income shares. In the 
model total gross income is J.LN. Furthermore, Lt xN, Lh = xN and mean 
income J.l is increasing in x. The share of total gross income going to the 
low-skilled is s1 = w 1L1+rk,L1 so that the Lorenz curve looks like Figure 3 p.N 
below. 
The LC has a kink at the point A at which (1 - x) percent of the 
population receive st percent of total income. From this one may calculate the 
Gini coefficient as 
[
(1-x)st (1-st)x] · G=l-2 2 +xst+ 2 =1-(st+x) 
where the expression in square brackets represents the area under the LC. 
Recall that Wt = a.kt and Wh = a.kt(l + x"'-1) so that gross mean income is 
given by J.l = (1-x)wt+xw,+rkt = (1+x")kt. Then St = ol(!~!)+(1-a.)(1-x) 
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Figure 3: Ordinary Lorenz Curve 
share in total income 
Sf 
0 
share in population 
so that 
GY = (1- x)- (1- a)(1- x)- a(1- x) = _a('-1_-_x-'-)x_"' 
1+x"' 1+x"' 
Then the effect of an increase in x on G9 depends on 
sgn(G~J = [a2x"'-1(1- x) ax"'] (1 + x"')- a 2x"'-1x"'(1- x) 
ax"'-1 ([a(1- x)- x] (1 + x"')- ax"'(1- x)). 
(A1) 
For low x an increase in x raises GY, whereas for higher values of x a higher x 
reduces it. Hence, the Gini coefficient does not produce unambiguous rankings 
of the (gross) income distribution. 
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B Data Appendix 
Data Sources 
• Barra and Lee (1994): Data set available at: 
www.nber.orgjpubjbarro.lee/ZIP / 
• Summers and Heston (1991}: Penn World Table (Mark 5.6}. Available at: 
www. nber. orgjpwt56.html. 
• OECD Education Database. Available at: 
www.oecd.orgjjelsjedu/EAG98/list.html. 
• Deininger and Squire (1996}. Data set available at: 
11/Ww.worldbank.orgjhtmljprdmgjgrthwebjdddeisqu.html. 
Definition of variables22 
G60-90 average growth rate of real GDP per capita for the period 1960-1990 in per-
centage points, where G60-90 = Inur;::lnyo and YT denotes per capita GDP at 
final date T. (Source: Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6.} 
SECL Percentage of the labour force from 25 to 64 years of age who have attained at 
least upper secondary education. (Source: OECD) 
TERL Percentage of the labour force from 25 to 64 years of age who have attained 
tertiary education. (Source: OECD} 
AIHG Average Gini coefficient for gross income of households for the period 1960-1990 
(Source: DeiningerfSquire) 
LY60 Natural logarithm of the level of real GDP per capita in 1960. (Source: Penn 
World Tables, Mark 5.6; Variable: RGDPL, i.e. real GDP per capita in 1985 
international prices.) 
GEDU Government expenditure on education as a fraction of GDP for the period 
1960-1985 in percentage points. (Source: Barro-Lee) 
PRIGHT Gastil's index of political rights (from 1 to 7; 1 =most freedom) for the period 
1972-1989. (Source: Barro-Lee} 
CVLIB Gastil's index of civil liberties (from 1 to 7; 1 = most freedom) for the period 
1972-1989. (Source: Barro-Lee) 
OECD Dummy for OECD countries. 
EDUPR Imputed productivity index of the education technology (from 0 to 1; 0 =most 
productive) for the period 1960-1985. 
22 A detailed description of the data and how the paper's results were obtained is 
provided at: http:/ /www.tu-da17nstadt.de/~rehmejgaac99/data.html. 
32 
Table 3: Country Sample 
AIHG G60-90 SECL TERL LY60 GEDU · PRIGHT CVLIB EDUPR 
Belgium• 28.3 2.9 63.3 13.7 8.6 5.4 1.0 1.0 0.157 
Italy• 28.7 3.3 45.8 11.5 8.4 3.8 1.2 1.6 0.238 
Finland• 29.9 3.3 71.4 13.5 8.6 5.8 1.8 1.9 0.118 
Norway* 30.8 3.3 85.0 17.2 8.6 6.3 1.0 1.0 (1.05(1 
Canada 31.2 2.9 81.6 19.6 8.9 6.8 1.0 1.0 0.076 
Germany 31.4 2.6 86.3 15.4 8.8 4.0 1.0 1.6 0.046 
Netherlands• 32.2 2.5 70.5 27.0 8.7 7.0 1.0 1.0 0.131 
Sweden• 32.4 2.2 76.8 14.5 8.9 7.1 1.1 1.0 0.100 
Denmark 32.5 2.4 71.2 17.2 8.8 6.3 1.0 1.0 0.123 
United Kingdom• 33.6 2.2 81.3 14.7 8.8 5.2 1.0 1.0 0.070 
New Zealand 34.4 1.2 65.5 12.9 9.0 4.7 1.0 1.0 0.138 
Korea 34.5 6.7 62.3 20.9 6.8 3.7 4.4 5.2 0.144 
Spain 34.6 3.7 38.3 16.9 8.0 1.9 2.4 2.9 0.242 
United States 35.5 2.0 89.1 28.5 9.2 5.9 1.0 1.0 0.041 
Australia 37.9 2.1 62.8 17.3 9.0 4.7 1.0 1.0 0.152 
Ireland• 38.9 3.4 57.0 13.7 8.1 5.1 1.0 1.2 0.188 
France 42.1 2.9 66.1 11.1 8.7 4.4 1.0 1.9 0.133 
Thailand 45.5 4.4 14.2 6.5 6.8 3.0 3.9 3.8 0.557 
Turkey 50.4 2.8 22.2 9.1 7.4 3.5 3.3 3.9 0.450 
Malaysia 50.8 4.3 38.5 9.4 7.3 4.7 3.1 4.1 0:312 
Brazil 56.1 2.7 28.3 11.0 7.5 2.8 3.4 3.4 0.353 
Mean 36.7 3.1 60.8 15.3 8.3 4.9 1.8 2.0 0.182 
Std. Dev. 7.9 1.1 21.8 5.5 0.7 1.4 1.2 1.3 0.135 
EDUPR denotes the productivity of the education technology. It represents imputed values of ' of 
equation (2) in the text and has been proxied by l:(~~gt'/1°0°Jl. The starred countries' data arc based 
on 'cs' and the unstarred ones are based on 'accept' Gini coefficients from Deininger and Squire (1996). 
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29 63 2 6 
47 30 13 11 
24 29 31 17 
16 74 X JQ 
34 44 7 15 
33 46 Q 12 
.a 41 Q 10 
19 60 9 13 
56 25 7 12 
37 5J X ]J 
50 28 12 11 
62 30 X 8 
39 42 X 19 
71 18 X 1J 
37 1.() X 23 
.a 35 14 11 
18 55 11 16 
26 61 3 10 
ao 9 3 1 
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Poland: Yeor of reference 1995. 
Jukey: Yeor or reterence 1997. 







































37 35 11 17 100 
23 68 2 7 100 
D 33 ~ U ~ 
18 29 33 20 100 
12 76 X 12 ](l) 
29 47 B 17 100 
29 ~ w u ~ 
34 44 11 11 100 
14 61 10 15 100 
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Percentage of the population that has attained a ipecific level of education. by age gro<.p (1996) 
Age Age Age 
Australia 57 62 60 54 46 15 16 18 14 
Austria 71 82 75 67 53 6 7 7 5 
8elgi.Jm 53 70 58 47 31 11 14 11 10 
Canedo 76 85 81 73 56 17 20 18 17 
Czedl Repub6c 84 92 87 84 71 10 11 12 10 
Denmol1c: 66 74 70 65 50 15 16 17 16 
F10lond 67 83 76 60 40 12 13 13 12 
France 60 74 64 56 38 10 12 10 10 
Germany 81 86 85 81 71 13 13 16 14 
Greece 44 66 52 36 22 12 16 14 II 
HUOQOIY 63 80 75 62 28 13 14 IS IS 
Ireland 50 66 54 38 30 11 14 11 9 
lloly 38 52 46 31 17 8 8 11 8 
Korea 61 88 63 41 25 19 30 18 11 
luxembourg 7!1 32 33 28 20 II 11 14 12 
Nelherlands 63 72 66 57 47 23 25 25 21 
New Zealand 60 65 64 56 49 11 14 13 10 
Norway 82 91 87 78 62 16 19 17 14 
74 88 82 68 47 10 10 10 12 
20 32 24 15 9 7 II 9 6 
30 50 34 20 11 13 19 15 10 
74 87 80 70 53 13 11 1S 16 
80 87 82 78 71 10 11 10 9 6 
17 23 19 14 7 6 7 7 7 3 
76 87 81 71 60 13 15 15 12 8 
86 87 88 86 77 26 26 26 28 20 
60 72 65 55 42 13 15 14 12 
27 36 7!1 21 15 
25 31 27 19 11 9 11 
8 11 9 6 6 5 
19 28 17 13 
33 48 32 18 8 m m m m m 
33 43 31 26 19 11 13 II 9 6 
13 19 14 7 4 6 9 7 3 I 
27 36 30 22 14 10 14 12 8 s 
Poland: Year of reference 1995. 
Turkey: Year of reference 1997 
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